

Message Text

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 DRC-01 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03 NEA-10

NSAE-00 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 USIA-15 TRSE-00

MBFR-04 SAJ-01 SS-15 NSC-10 EURE-00 ACDA-19 OMB-01

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FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1955

INFO SECDEF WASHDC

ALL NATO CAPITALS 3328

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 4734

E.O. 11652: GDS, 12-31-79

TAGS: PFOR, NATO

SUBJECT: ATLANTIC RELATIONS: PERMREP DE ROSE'S COMMENTARY ON
FRENCH DECLARATION OF THE 15

REF: USNATO 4698

THERE FOLLOWS INFORMAL MISSION TRANSLATION OF FRENCH PERMREP
DE ROSE'S COMMENTARY ON THE DRAFT DECLARATION OF THE 15
WHICH HE CIRCULATED DURING OCTOBER 3 NAC (FRENCH TEXT REFTEL).

BEGIN TEXT OF COMMENTARY:

ANALYSIS OF THE STATEMENTS MADE BY THE
REPRESENTATIVE OF FRANCE IN THE NORTH
ATLANTIC COUNCIL, OCTOBER 3, 1973

THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF FRANCE STATED THAT IN
DEVELOPING THE DOCUMENT ENTITLED "DRAFT DECLARATION OF THE
15 ON ATLANTIC RELATIONS," THE FRENCH AUTHORITIES HAD SOUGHT
TO PROPOSE A TEXT WHICH COULD BE CONSIDERED AS THE BASIS FOR
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A POLICY WHICH THE ALLIES SHOULD FOLLOW IN ASSURING THEIR SECURITY
DURING THE YEARS TO COME. THIS WAS IN RESPONSE TO THE SUGGESTION
MADE BY MR. KISSINGER DURING HIS SPEECH OF LAST APRIL. IT WAS
THEREFORE NOT A MATTER OF DEVELOPING A DOCUMENT OF TEMPORARY

RELEVANCE; INSTEAD, IT WAS THOUGHT NECESSARY TO CONVEY TO OUR COUNTRIES THE SENSE OF PERMANENCE IN THE RELATIONSHIP WHICH UNITES US, BUT ALSO TO CALL FOR THEIR COMMITMENT TO A CERTAIN POLICY WHICH WILL REQUIRE EFFORT. FURTHERMORE, THE FRENCH AUTHORITIES SOUGHT TO DEVELOP A DOCUMENT WHICH WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE 15. IF THIS TEXT IS TO RECEIVE OFFICIAL SANCTION ON THE OCCASION OF AN EVENT AS AUSPICIOUS AS A MEETING OF THE COUNCIL, AS BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE VISIT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, IT SEEMED PREFERABLE THAT SUCH A TEXT SHOULD ONLY INCLUDE THOSE ELEMENTS WHICH HAD BEEN AGREED TO AMONG US.

THE FRENCH AUTHORITIES HOPED THAT THE ALLIES WOULD RECOGNIZE THE GREAT EFFORT WHICH THIS DOCUMENT REPRESENTED IN SEEKING TO BRING TOGETHER THEIR CONCERNS.

NATURALLY, THE SUBMISSION OF THIS TEXT WOULD IN NO WAY ALTER THE FRENCH POSITION WITH RESPECT TO INTEGRATION, NOR WITH RESPECT TO THE MODALITIES OF OUR COOPERATION WITH THE ALLIANCE. IF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE FRENCH DOCUMENT WERE TO BE ACCEPTED, HOWEVER, THE DECLARATION WOULD FORMALIZE OUR AGREEMENT ON WHAT IS ESSENTIAL TO THE SECURITY OF THE COMMON DEFENSE. FINALLY, THE FRENCH AUTHORITIES DESIRED TO PRESENT A TEXT WHICH CONTAINS NO AGGRESSIVE OR POLITICAL NOTE, BUT RATHER A TEXT WHICH SPEAKS THE LANGUAGE OF PURE TRUTH, EVEN AND ESPECIALLY IF SUCH LANGUAGE IS VERY STRAIGHTFORWARD.

THE FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE THEN TURNED TO AN EXPLANATION OF THE TEXT ITSELF. SOME OF MY COLLEAGUES MAY NOTE HOW THEIR OWN SUGGESTIONS HAVE BEEN BORROWED. THIS WAS NORMAL SINCE MANY OF THE IDEAS ARE SHARED. BUT THE DOCUMENT JUST SUBMITTED SOUGHT TO STRESS A CONTINUATION OF THE REASONING WHICH GIVES STRENGTH AND COHESION TO ALL THESE ELEMENTS.

THE IDEAS, THEN, WERE AS FOLLOWS:

A. THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION ARE VULNERABLE ONLY TO STRATEGIC WEAPONS, THE BALANCE BETWEEN THE WEAPONS SYSTEMS OF THESE TWO COUNTRIES HAS THE EFFECT, HOWEVER, OF ESTABLISHING A VERY LARGE DEGREE OF STABILITY IN THEIR RELATIONSHIPS, EUROPE, ON THE CONTRARY, IS VULNERABLE TO TACTICAL NUCLEAR WARFARE, TO CONVENTIONAL WARFARE AND TO POLITICAL PRESSURE
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EVEN IF IT DID NOT FEEL ITSELF PROTECTED. THAT IS WHAT ENABLES ONE TO SAY THAT EUROPEAN DEFENSE PROBLEMS ARE ACQUIRING AN EVER-INCREASING DEGREE OF SPECIFICITY.

B. FAR FROM DIMINISHING ALLIED SOLIDARITY, THIS SITUATION, ON THE CONTRARY, CHANGES NOTHING TO THE ESSENTIAL QUESTION: THAT IS, IN ORDER TO RESOLVE THIS SPECIFIC PROBLEM, UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IS IRREPLACEABLE; AND THAT THERE IS AT PRESENT NO ALTERNATIVE TO THE SECURITY WHICH UNITED STATES NUCLEAR FORCES, BASED EITHER IN AMERICA OR IN EUROPE, PROVIDE.

BUT CERTAIN OBLIGATIONS AND OBSERVATIONS RESULT FROM THIS SITUATION: (A) FOR THE EUROPEANS (WHOSE IMPORTANT EFFORT IN THE CONVENTIONAL FIELD IS NOTEWORTHY), IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THEY

COMMIT THEMSELVES TO PROVIDING A NECESSARY CONTRIBUTION FOR MAINTAINING A COMMON DEFENSE AT A LEVEL WHICH WILL INSURE DETERRENCE.

MR. DE ROSE INVITED HIS COLLEAGUES TO NOTE THAT HIS AUTHORITIES ALSO WANTED TO POINT OUT THAT THE EVOLUTION OF THE EEC TOWARD POLITICAL UNITY SHOULD HAVE A FAVORABLE IMPACT IN DUE TIME ON THE CONTRIBUTION OF MEMBER COUNTRIES TO EUROPEAN DEFENSE PROBLEMS. THIS WAS ONLY A PASSING REFERENCE TO THE QUESTION SINCE IT APPEARS IMPOSSIBLE TO SAY MORE ABOUT IT AT THIS TIME. BUT IN A DOCUMENT INTENDED TO BE VALID FOR A LONG PERIOD, AN INDICATION SEEMED USEFUL.

FINALLY, THE DOCUMENT MENTIONS THE DETERRENT ROLE OF FRENCH AND BRITISH NUCLEAR FORCES. SUCH MENTION WAS USEFUL, FIRST OF ALL BECAUSE IT IS TRUE, AND SECOND BECAUSE TWO AMERICAN DOCUMENTS HAVE ALREADY EXPRESSED THESE IDEAS DURING THE COURSE OF THE LAST 18 MONTHS. THE FIRST WAS THE PRESIDENT'S REVIEW OF FOREIGN POLICY, DATED FEBRUARY 9, 1972, THE SECOND WAS DRAFT DECLARATION WHICH MR. KISSINGER GAVE TO SEVERAL OF HIS COLLEAGUES AT THE BEGINING OF THE SUMMER. THE PHRASING WAS SUCH THAT IT WOULD NOT ALLOW SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS AT SALT TO BRING IT UP AND THEREBY DEMAND THE INCLUSION OF BRITISH AND FRENCH FORCES IN THEIR CALCULATIONS.

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FM USMISSION NATO

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ALL NATO CAPITALS 3329

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 4734

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT - PARA C, LINE 36)

C. AS TO THE UNITED STATES, THE DRAFT NOTES THAT THE STAKES OF A CONFLICT WOULD BE DOMINATION OF THE WORLD -- THIS BY MEANS OF THE DISAPPEARANCE OF EUROPE'S INDEPENDENCE. THIS VIEW JUSTIFIED THE ASSERTION THAT AMERICAN FORCES ARE IN EUROPE FOR THE

DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES ITSELF, AS WELL AS FOR THAT OF ITS EUROPEAN ALLIES. AMERICAN LEADERS HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS. THE FRENCH PROPOSITION WAS AIMED AT MAKING IT EXPLICIT.

AS A CONSEQUENCE, THE DRAFT DECLARATION SETS FORTH; THE NECESSITY FOR THE PRESENCE OF AMERICAN FORCES IN EUROPE; THE AFFIRMATION BY WASHINGTON THAT IT WOULD NOT ACCEPT ANY EXTERNAL PRESSURE WHICH WOULD EXPOSE EUROPE TO A LOSS OF ITS LIBERTY; AND ITS COMMITMENT TO MAINTAIN AMERICAN FORCES IN EUROPE AT A LEVEL NECESSARY TO ASSURE DETERRENCE AND THE CAPABILITY TO DEFEND THE NORTH ATLANTIC ZONE SHOULD DETERRENCE FAIL.

FURTHERMORE, REFERENCE IS MADE TO THE SOVIET-AMERICAN AGREEMENT OF JUNE 22, 1973. THOSE COLLEAGUES OF MINE WHO WERE PRESENT AT THE CONVERSATIONS IN SAN CLEMENTE WILL EASILY RECOGNIZE ITS ORIGIN. DR. KISSINGER STATED AT THAT TIME THAT THE PRESIDENT AS WELL

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AS HE HIMSELF HAD TOLD THEIR SOVIET INTERLOCUTORS WITH THE GREATEST POSSIBLE CLARITY THAT IN ANY CASE OF CONFLICT, THE AGREEMENT OF THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR WOULD BE INVALIDATED, AND THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE AGREE TO MAKE USE OF ALL NECESSARY WEAPONS FOR ITS OWN DEFENSE AS WELL AS THAT OF ITS ALLIES. THIS STATEMENT WAS AIMED AT INFORMING THOSE CIRCLES WHO MIGHT HAVE MISINTERPRETED THE AGREEMENT THAT IT WAS AIMED AT PREVENTING ANY KIND OF WAR, BUT WAS NOT INTENDED TO FIX THE RULES AND LIMITATIONS ACCORDING TO WHICH A WAR WOULD BE CONDUCTED.

FINALLY, THE DOCUMENT INCLUDES A LAST POINT CONCERNING DEFENSE DOCTRINE. IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT THIS IS A POINT OF DIVERGENCE BETWEEN FRANCE AND ITS ALLIES; THE PROPOSED FORMULATION -- WHICH STATES THAT ALL NECESSARY MEANS WOULD BE USED TO PREVENT A POSSIBLE ADVERSARY FROM ATTAINING THE OBJECTIVES WHICH HE MIGHT SEEK IN INITIATING A CONFLICT -- ENDOWS THE DEFENSE CONCEPT WITH A SENSE OF POLITICAL RATHER THAN AN OPERATIONAL DURABILITY. THE FORMULATION THUS SEEMS CAPABLE OF TERMINATING A QUARREL, AND WOULD PERMIT ADJUSTMENTS TO BE MADE WHICH MIGHT EVENTUALLY BE NECESSARY. THIS DOES NOT IMPLY THE RALLYING OF ITS AUTHORITIES TO THE ALLIED POINT OF VIEW, NOR DOES IT REQUIRE THEM TO CHANGE THEIR OWN OPINION.

THE FOREGOING ARE THE EXPLANATIONS WHICH THE REPRESENTATIVE OF FRANCE SOUGHT TO GIVE AS TO WHAT THE TEXT SAID. IT REMAINED FOR HIM TO EXPLAIN WHAT IT DID NOT SAY. THIS CONCERNS ESSENTIALLY THE PROBLEM OF FORCE REDUCTIONS AND BURDEN-SHARING. IT DID NOT SEEM USEFUL TO MENTION THESE TWO CURRENT PROBLEMS IN A DOCUMENT WHICH, BEING INTENDED TO APPLY FOR A LONG PERIOD, SHOULD NOT RAISE MONETARY ISSUES. HE EXPLAINED HIS AUTHORITIES REASONS FOR HAVING DEVELOPED A SINGLE DOCUMENT APPLICABLE TO THE 15, INSTEAD OF SEVERAL DOCUMENTS, I.E., ONE FOR THE 15 AND OTHERS FOR THE 14. IF OTHER GOVERNMENTS FOUND IT NECESSARY TO MENTION THESE PROBLEMS, HIS OWN GOVERNMENT COULD ONLY TAKE NOTE, BUT WITHOUT ASSOCIATING ITSELF WITH THEM.

HE CONCLUDED BY RECALLING THAT WHEN THE FRENCH MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SPOKE BEFORE THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY LAST JUNE,

HE HAD INDICATED THAT THE PROBLEM OF EUROPEAN DEFENSE WOULD
CONSTITUTE THE BACKGROUND FOR DISCUSSIONS WHICH WOULD TAKE
PLACE THIS YEAR BOTH IN EUROPE AND OUTSIDE OF EUROPE.

NUMEROUS GOVERNMENTS HAD QUERIED THE MEANING OF THIS
REMARK. THE DOCUMENT WHICH THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAS JUST
SUBMITTED FOR ALLIED EXAMINATION IS IN LARGE MEASURE A RESPONSE
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TO THIS QUESTION.
END TEXT.
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